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FREE PRESS vs. FAIR TRIAL
HUBERT L. WILL

There is a good deal of loose reasoning on the subject of the
liberty of the press, as if its inviolability were constitutionally
such, that, like the King of England, it could do no wrong,
and was free from every inquiry, and afforded a perfect sanctuary for every abuse; that, in short, it implied a despotic sovereigny to do every sort of wrong, without the slightest accountabiliy to private or public justice. Such a notion is too
extravagant to be held by any sound constitutional lawyer,
with regard to the rights and duties belonging to governments
generally, or to the state governments in particular ... A man
may be allowed to keep poisons in his closet; but not publicly
to vend them as cordials.
2 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the
United States, sec. 1884 (2d ed. 1851) 1

UCR of the serious comment and reflections on the shortcomings of the American press 2 is nurtured by a noble vision of
the role of a free press 3 in our society. It is a vision which I
and many others share. Indeed, it is hard to enunciate thoughtful words
critical of this free institution which do not at the same time commend it to all humanity and cherish it as indispensable to democracy.
This is as it should be. And yet, as doubtless with other critical analyses, the impetus for this article is the all-too-frequent failure of the
press, either through lack of concern or lack of understanding or both,
to subscribe to standards and perform in a fashion which fortify and
replenish the democratic system, not degrade it or pander to its basest
aspects.
"Freedom of the press" is a slogan in our national life, and like
1 Quoted in Edelman, Freedom of the Press-License to Obstruct Justice? 1, May
1961 (unpublished paper in Harvard Law School Library).
2 There is an ever-growing body of scholarly discussion in legal and other periodicals
on the shortcomings of the American press, especially as they affect the right to a
fair trial. Many of these periodicals will be referred to by citation in subsequent footnotes as this article progresses.
3 Throughout this article the word "press" is meant to apply to all media which
disseminate news, including radio and television; particular emphasis, however, is
meant to be given to the daily newspaper.

Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. A.B., University of Chicago, 1935, J.D., 1937. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of
Robert M. Grossman, A.B., Dartmouth College, 1956; LL.B., Y'ale Law School, 1961.
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many such phrases which have embedded themselves in the historical
consciousness of the country, its purpose and meaning are too often
and too easily obscured by its mere invocation. This is no less true of
it when used or applied in a legal context. As Mr. Justice Holmes once
aptly observed, "It is one of the misfortunes of the law that ideas become encysted in phrases and thereafter for a long time cease to provoke further analysis." 4
Of all the ideas which have suffered this analytical paralysis, none
suffers more than "freedom of the press." And nowhere, as will develop, is its contagion more injurious than in the courtroom. Both
within and without the legal profession, the easy acceptance of this
phrase as a kind of necessary nostrum for every ill of democracy, regardless of whether or not it proves an appropriate and effective ministration, has created a situation which makes the press' treatment of
criminal trials and certain of their antecedents 5 a significant threat to
the fair administration of criminal justice by the courts.
In most areas which are subjected to news coverage, the charge
generally lodged against the press is that it has abused its right to inform the public, either by misinforming or not fully informing the
reader, viewer or listener, slanting a report in a particular direction,
misquoting, unfairly interpreting a certain situation or the like. These
are problems of thoroughness and accuracy, of professional competence and integrity, and while they also inhere in the coverage of
criminal trials and almost invariably result in an inaccurate and incomplete picture of what is actually happening in the courtroom, they
are not, as such, the principal sources of injury to the judicial system.
If they were, the judiciary's complaint against the press, while substantial, would not vary markedly from that of other individuals or
groups whose activities are relatively open to press scrutiny.
The distinctive and overriding concern of those responsible for the
administration of criminal justice, however, is that the press, even
when it reports crimes and criminal trials with reasonable thorough4Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 391 (1912)

(dissenting opinion).
5Disclosure by the press before trial of such information (referred to in the text as
"antecedents") as, e.g., the accused's prior criminal record, the existence of a confession or of incriminating evidence seized in the course of a search or arrest, the refusal
of an accused to submit to a lie-detector test, or the opinion of anyone on the question
of guilt or innocence may, as will appear within, substantially impair the prospects for
a fair trial.
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ness and accuracy--which is seldom 6-too often in the very process
encroaches upon and subverts the constitutional right to a fair trial by
an impartial jury.7 The manner and extent of this will be recited below. It is enough to state here that press interference with the proper
administration of criminal justice is no mine-run interference with a
relatively inconsequential activity in society which must compete in
the marketplace, as it were, for attention, influence and effectiveness;
it is an interference with a constitutionally protected guarantee, one
to which the Bill of Rights accords at least as full dignity as "freedom
of the press."8 This analysis, it seems to me, properly dislodges the

press from the superior footing which it enjoys in constitutionally
unprotected areas, and requires that it justify itself in a no-more-than-

equal setting.
The First Amendment's free press guarantee, like all other constitutional guarantees, is not absoluteY Just as not every form of speech
6 Mr. Justice Frankfurter had this to say on the question of press coverage of
criminal trials:
"... When I arrived here in time for the opening of the Jaw school, I didn't know
that there was such a crime as the Braintree holdup-murder. So far as I know I'd never
heard the names Sacco and Vanzetti. I knew nothing about it-just nothing. Soon, however, it got into the papers, and I didn't read anything about it because it was my
habit, is my habit, engendered from my experience in the United States Attorney's
Office, not to read accounts of trials as reported in the press unless the press purports
to report the trial verbatim.. My experience during those years about trials in which I
took part as I saw them reported even in the best papers was distortion; mutilation and

at best an 6paque account of what took place in the court room." (FELIX FRANKFURTER
REMINISCES 208 [Phillips ed. 1960]). My own experience with press coverage of trials
in which I have taken part entirely confirms Mr. Justice Frankfurter's experiences.
7 U.S. Const. amend. VI: the constitutions of thirty-nine states embody a similar
guarantee of impartiality and in the remaining eleven it is reasonably inferable from
the right to trial by jury. See Edelman, Freedom of the Press-License to Obstruct
Justice?, note I supra, at 16-17. See also Columbia Univ. Legislative Drafting Research
Fund, Index Digest of State Constitutions 578-79 (1959), referred to in Note, Community Hostility and the Right to an Impartialjury, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 349 n. 5 (1960).
8 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Irvin v. Doud, 366 U.S. 717, 730 (1961)
stated: "This Court has not yet decided that the fair administration of criminal justice
must be subordinated to another safeguard of our constitutional system-freedom of
the press, properly conceived."
9 Those who take the position that there arc absolutes in the Bill of Rights usually
relieve themselves of the logical inconsistency of such a position through the use of
semantics. Mr. Justice Black, for instance, asserts that the rights set forth in the Bill
of Rights, including "freedom of the press," are absolutes, subject to no qualifications
whatsoever-"without ifs, buts or whereases." Accordingly, he denies the validity of
all laws relating to. libel or defamation. See generally, his lecture, 35 N.Y.U.L. Rv.
865 (1960) and his interview, 37 N.Y.UL. REv. 549 (1962).
lowever, when he was asked during the course of his interview (p. 558) whether it
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or writing is within the contemplation of the free speech protection, °
so not every form of press inquiry is within the free press protection."
Nor, as a matter of logic, can any constitutional guarantee be absolute, for there is an inevitable overlapping of and competition between
protected rights, out of which some accommodation in reason and
policy must be reached in order12 that one not be largely sacrificed for
the sake of preserving another.

Accordingly, when "freedom of the press" competes with other
constitutionally protected guarantees, particularly when it encroaches
on their domain-which is the way in which the conflict usually arises
-it should be held to a high degree of accountability and prove itself
of significant social value in order to warrant the intrusion. When the
press moves in these other protected areas, it cannot be permitted to

turn its attention willy-nilly on every event or item which fulfills its
often elusive and sometimes jaded concept of news, in disregard of
rights which are as fully and equally enshrined in the Constitution. 3
Confidential government documents, for example, however news-14
worthy, are not the legitimate subject of complete press inquiry.
Disclosure to the press of information not open to the public generally could seriously undermine the various branches of the Governwould be constitutional to prosecute someone who falsely shouted "fire" in a theatrc,
he first made the statement that "[nlobody has ever said that the First Amendment
gives people a right to go anywhere in the world they want to go or say anything in
the world they want to say" and then stated that the man shouting "fire" would be
arrested "not because of wbat he hollered, but because he hollered." This, it seems to
me, is merely playing with words.
See also note 38 infra.
10 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) and Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250 (1952) wherein obscenity and group libel, respectively, were held not to be
within the protection of the first amendment.
11 See note 14 infra and accompanying text.
12 See American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 398 (1950) where
the Court said, "The right of the public to be protected from evils of conduct, even
though First Amendment rights of persons or groups are thereby in some manner
infringed, has received frequent and consistent recognition by this Court." In this
regard, the Court cites such cases as Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (blaring
sound truck); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (health of children); and
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (unauthorized parade). See also note 38
infra.
13 ibid.; see also note 8 supra.
14 See Trimble v. Johnston, 173 F. Supp. 651 (D.D.C. 1959) (denial of a mandatory
injunction which would have required defendants to permit plaintiff to inspect and
copy certain payroll records and other documents and papers relating to disbursement
of Govcrnicnt funds by the United States Senate).
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ment in the discharge of duties and responsibilities entrusted to them
by the Constitution. 15 This restraint on the press has sound reasons to
support it, reasons to which much of the press itself subscribes. It
should be added, of course, that control of allegedly classified infor-

mation may be subject to abuses by the Government, but in this realm
of constitutional conflict, the overall balance decidedly favors the
Government's interest over that of "freedom of the press."
In much the ,same sense, the press must come forward with sound
reasons to justify its present treatment of crime and the criminal trial
as that treatment affects the fair administration of justice. And these

reasons must have deeper roots than the press' own subjective standard
of newsworthiness, since that standard often accords the administration of criminal justice little more significance and stature than that
accorded the death of a movie actress, a catastrophe or a sporting
event. In this constitutionally protected area, some basis other than

the lurid or curious appeal which the entire transaction may have for
the paying customer must be demonstrated.
ASSUMPTIONS EXAMINED

Perhaps the most obvious but unanalyzed assumption on which
press coverage of criminal trials rests is that the constitutional guarantee of "freedom of the press" confers on the public and the press a
so-called "right to know," a doctrine which is much used but illdefined. 6 If there were any such right, it should logically permit rep15 Id. at 656, wherein the Court stated, "Thus, it would hardly be argued that the
press, in exercising its Constitutional privilege, may insist on the admission of its
representatives to meetings and conferences that are not open to the public, such as, for
example, executive sessions of Congressional committees, meetings of the President's
cabinet, conferences of judges in deciding cases that have been argued before them,

as well as other similar groups. Similarly, it would hardly be urged that the press is
entitled to access to written material that the law does not regard as being automatically
open to public inspection, such as, for example, staff reports submitted to Congressional
Committees, until the latter choose to release them; letters to the President from his
advisers, unless he sees fit to make them public; memoranda written by personnel of
executive departments to their superiors; or drafts of contemplated or tentative
opinions of members of the judiciary until they take final form and are publicly
handed down....

"The conclusion is inevitable that the Constitutional privilege of freedom of the
press does not include a right on the part of representatives of the press to inspect
documents not open to members of the public generally."
16 This doctrine, which has found expression in such articles as Douglas, The Public
Trial mid the Free Press, 46 A.B.A.J. 840 (1960) and Wiggins, The Public's Right to
Public Trial, 19 F.R.D. 25, 35 (1955), has no specific support in the Constitution. As
Emory H. Niles, Chief Judge of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, stated in "The
Law of the United States: The Power of the Court and a Free Press," an address at
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resentatives of the press to be present in the judge's chambers during
pretrial: conferences regarding such: matters as legal questions which
may arise at the trial, the conduct of the voir dire examination, etc.;
similar conferences during trial dealing with the court's instructions
to the jury and other matters; and, of course, during the deliberations
of the jury itself. There has been no serious suggestion, however, that
any of these areas are properly within the surveillance of the press.
Indeed, as to jury deliberations, Congress has made it a criminal offense for any person knowingly and willfully to record, listen to or
observe a grand or petit jury "while such jury is deliberating or voting." 17 It would seem that proponents of the so-called "right to
know" should leap to challenge the constitutionality of this enactment. The fact is that no such right is to be found in the Constitution,
and further, as is apparent from the foregoing discussions of trials and
the non-disclosure of confidential government documents, there are
a whole host of matters which would appeal to the variegated interest
of the public but to which no one supposes the press should be privy.
In all the talk about the "right to know" as it relates to criminal
proceedings, the point which generally and conveniently escapes the
attention of the press is the reason for the public nature of criminal
trials. The Sixth Amendment provides, in part: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed,..." Nowhere else in the Constitution is there
mention of any other beneficiary of the right to a public trial than the
accused-neither the press, the public, the judge nor the jurors. The
presence of the press is merely an avenue by which the accused may
obtain a fuller expression of this right. Yet it is a right which, to say
the least, has become of dubious value. Indeed, it is the harshest irony
that the exercise of a right secured to the accused is all too often the
vehicle of his destruction.'
the 85th Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, August 4, 1962: "Some
newspapers have at times tried to justify such publications by the invention of a
'Right to Know' in the public. Whatever such a right may amount to, it is not mentioned in the Constitution, and I think it is hardly debatable that if its exercise interferes
with a constitutional right, it must yield to the rights set fofth in the Constitution."
17 18 U.S.C. sec. 1508.
18 See, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) and Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S.
310 (1959), wherein: press treatment of the respective cases prior to and during the trials
resulted in such prejudice to the defendants that neither was able to secure a fair trial.
In his concurring opinion in the Irvin case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated at 730:
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The main benefit which the accused is meant to derive from a public trial is protection against the arbitrary use of judicial power."
While there is always a danger of such an abuse, it is highly questionable whether press coverage of criminal trials affords any appreciable
source of restraint. In fact, the erroneous and distorted picture which
the press often conveys of criminal proceedings is much more likely
to create the illusion of malfeasance or, conversely, the illusion of
competence where one or the other does not exist.
The real safeguards to the accused in curbing judicial excesses are
not only his right to a public trial, 20 but, of equal or greater importance, the quality of judges, the rigorous employment of the adversary system by competent counsel, the provisions for appellate review,
and the various guardians, not directly connected with the courts but
within the legal profession and academic community, who provide
scholarly analysis of the judicial system, its shortcomings and its developments. This is not to say that the press, as a conduit in aid of the
right to a public trial, has no role to play in guarding and preserving
the integrity of the courts. Regrettably, though, it has too often
wielded its considerable power as an instrument of subversion, not
improvement or enlightenment.
Notwithstanding the abstract benefit which the press may afford
the courts and litigants, it must be remembered that its access to the
courtroom is not based on any inherent right which it enjoys, but
stems from the right of the accused to a fair trial and the assumption
that the press will further this end. It is a right which, like most rights,
can and at times has been waived. 1 And on such occasions the public
"Not a Term passes without this Court being importuned to review convictions, had
in States throughout the country, in which substantial claims are made that a jury trial
has been distorted because of inflammatory newspaper accounts-too often, as in this
case, with the prosecutor's collaboration-exerting pressures upon potential jurors before trial and even during the course of trial, thereby making it extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to secure a jury capable of taking in, free of prepossessions, evidence subnutted in open court. Indeed such extraneous influences, in violation of the decencies
guaranteed by our Constitution, are sometimes so powerful that an accused is forced, as
a practical matter, to forego trial by jury."
19 See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948).
20 Even as to this right it is sufficient "if, without partiality or favoritism, a reasonable
proportion of the public is suffered to attend, notwithstanding that those persons whose
presence could be of no service to the accused ... are excluded altogether." 1 Cooley,
ConstitutionalLimitations 647 (8th Ed. Carrington 1927).
21 See, e.g., United States v. Sorrentino, 175 F.2d 721 (3rd Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 868 (1949).

DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

and the press may be excluded.22 This, however, is at best only a partial solution, since an equally significant threat to the administration of
criminal justice is caused by pretrial publicity, which frequently
brings to the attention of prospective jurors and the public-at-large
information which, for reasons deemed essential to a fair trial,23 is excluded from the evidence presented to the jury.
Furthermore, there is no assurance that the accused would be will-

ing to waive his right to a public trial in a situation where there has
been substantial pretrial publicity and where the possibility of heavy

trial publicity impends. Since one basis for appeal from a conviction
is prejudicial press publicity, 24 few defendants move for press exclusion, in the hope that the appellate court will ultimately reverse the
conviction and order a new trial. 25 Here the interest of the sovereign

and the people come into play and the dubious efficacy of reversals on
grounds of prejudicial publicity can be seen. The vagaries of retrying
cases are many, particularly where the possibility of more prejudicial
publicity may again be a significant factor.26 Moreover, depending on

the lapse of time involved, the practical opportunity for a retrial may
have evaporated with the death of key winesses or the loss of valuable
evidence.27 Thus, it can be either the public or the accused who suf22 "[F]reedom of the press is in no way abridged by an exclusionary ruling which
denies to the public generally, including newspapermen, the opportunity to 'see and
hear what transpired.'" United Press Ass'ns v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 77, 123 N.E. 2d 777,
778 (1954).
23 See note 34 infra and accompanying text.
24 See note 18 supra.
25 Vhile there are no cases or other data which directly support this conclusion, it
seems a reasonable inference from the absence of such motions. It is worth noting the
case of People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E. 2d 769 (1954), however, wherein the
defendant, after conviction on two counts of compulsory prostitution, successfully
pressed the argument on appeal that the trial court's action in excluding, over his objection, all members of the public and the press except certain of his friends and relatives
constituted a denial of his right to a public trial.
26 As to the possibility of diminished publicity of a subsequent trial, the following
is a surmise from Comment, The Case against Trial by Newspaper, 57 N.W.U.L. Rev.
217, 226 n. 32:
"... It is quite possible that a potential deterrent effect will result-not by means of
the usual deterrent force-threat of existing modes of punishment-but by means of that
psychologicalpressure which renders a newsman hesitant to do that which he thinks is,
and which in fact is, likely to result in reversal of the conviction of a person whom the
newsman thinks is guilty, and which renders him fearful that continued reversals may
eventually lead to external curbs upon freedom of the press."
27 Cf., Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 98 n. 5 (1955); United States v. Fay, 183 F.
Supp. 222, 227 n. 6 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), rev'd, 300 F. 2d 345 (2nd Cir. 1962), aff'd Fay v.
Noia, 31 U.S.L.W. 4255 (March 18, 1963).
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fers as a result of the publicity, to say nothing of the ill effects on the
fair and efficient administration of criminal justice. AlI this, I believe,
is an extraordinary price to pay for our laissez-faire notion of "freedom of the press" and our relatively unexamined adherence to its
supposed all-embracing desirability.
There are other arguments which have been put forward to justify
the public airing of criminal trials by the press. One of these is the
educational value which the public is said to derive from an actual report of the workings of its courts, an argument closely associated with
the public's so-called "right to know. ' 28 While this argument deserves
some weight as an abstract proposition-an informed citizenry being
fundamental to the effective operation of a democratic society-it is
hardly sufficient to counterbalance the adverse effects of publicity on
the administration of criminal justice. Realistically speaking, though,
press reports of criminal trials do not enlighten the public, for there
is little, if any, educational value in reports filled with half-truths and
distortions.
If it is really the purpose of the press to inform the public about the
workings of its courts, that purpose would be much better served by
delaying the publication of the day-to-day proceedings of a criminal
trial until the trial has terminated.2 9 As it is, there is no assurance that
the press will report each day's proceedings in a particular trial, let
alone report them fully and accurately, and, accordingly, the likelihood that a witness' direct examination, for example, will receive
broad press attention while his cross-examination receives little or no
attention is great.30 From an educational standpoint, the most balanced picture which the press could convey of judicial proceedings,
short of a verbatim report, would come from a comprehensive summary after trial, not from the bits and pieces from which the public
now must endeavor to glean anything at all of value.
Another justification, and one deserving of more consideration, is
the legitimate interest which the public has in being apprised of the
28 See note 16 supra.
29 In England, e.g., in aid of strict enforcement of the doctrine of constructive contempt, only the fact of arrest and matters adhering to pretrial procedure can be published before the trial is concluded. See generally, Baltimore Radio Show v. Maryland,
338 U.S. 912, 921-36 (1950) (appendix to opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter re denial
of certiorari). There is nothing to indicate that English readers have lost interest in
criminal trials and the workings of their courts because of the enforced delay of publication.

3o See note 6 supra.
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occurrence of crime and the apprehension of a suspect. Certainly the
citizenry is entitled to be informed of the efficiency and effectiveness
of its police force and the relative safety of the community. Equally,
it is entitled to have any fear allayed, particularly in cases of heinous
crimes, by the knowledge that a bona fide suspect, without naming
the person, has been taken into custody.31 Few people would argue
against making this information available, assuming its accuracy under
the circumstances; indeed, this is an area in which the press performs
one of the kinds of services which its constitutional guarantee contemplates. No one is proposing to eliminate this service. What is proposed is that a long, hard look be taken at the accommodation which
has been reached between the equally cherished guarantees of free
press and fair trial in order to determine whether a serious readjustment is not required. It is my belief that, while the press has a legitimate role to play at the very early stages of the criminal process, the
nearer the case moves to trial and to an actual determination of guilt
or innocence, the less the role and interest of the press can be supported on any basis of reason, law or social policy and the more the
interests of justice merit protection.
THE BURDEN OF PROVING INJURY

Much of the foregoing has been predicated on the assumption that,
in fact, the press does adversely and significantly affect the fair administration of criminal justice. The press demands proof, contending
that there is no scientific evidence that prejudice does result from the
publication of information which the law will not permit the jury to
consider in determining guilt or innocence. 2
It seems appropriate here, however, to raise the question of who, in
fact, should bear the burden of proof and persuasion on this issue-the
courts or the press. The apparent assumption of the press in this, as in
most areas, is that the other side has the burden of demonstrating that
the press is out-of-bounds, never that the press has the burden of
demonstrating that it is within bounds. As previously indicated, the
former may be a fair assumption in unprotected areas, but not in areas
where the press clashes with another constitutional guarantee.38 It
31 While the name of a suspect will eventually become known to sources other than
the police if he or she is bound over for trial, it would seem that every effort should be
made to protect a person who has been picked up on suspicion of committing a crime
hut is later released.
32 See note 36 infra.
33 See text accompanying notes 6-12 supra.
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therefore seems at least equally justifiable for the judiciary to demand
proof by the press that its treatment of criminal. trials and certain of
their antecedents does not impinge on the fair administration of criminal justice. It is the press which invades the sanctuary of the courtroom, not the courtroom that of the press.
Accordingly, the press should demonstrate that the publication of a
person's prior criminal record or of his purported confession before
trial or before its admission into evidence during trial is neither adverse to the accused nor to the administration of justice. The presumption against the publication of such information, which AngloAmerican law permits to enter into the determination of guilt or
innocence only under the most carefully defined circumstances, 34 is
great. Yet this information is uniformly and with impunity broadcast,
frequently with provocative headlines, by the great majority of the
press long before that determination has been made.
It is argued, however, that not every juror or prospective juror may
have been contaminated by this information, that those who have can
be weeded out, and that, in any event, whatever adverse effects the
information may produce can be substantially erased from the minds of
the jurors. Trial judges who have faced the task of selecting an impartial panel of jurors in a case which has been subjected to widespread pretrial publicity know the lingering doubts which exist even
after all available protective techniques have been utilized.3 5 Why,
furthermore, should we have to tolerate the mere possibility of a contaminated panel of jurors when there is so little demonstrable benefit
which flows from the disclosure of such information and so much potential harm which may be inflicted on the defendant, the public and
the administration of justice? And, it should be pointed out, the only
scientific data available, though fragmentary, supports the conclusion
that emotionally charged news reporting is prejudicial.8 6
The law, in excluding from the knowledge of jurors certain information such as coerced confessions, prior criminal records, hearsay
evidence, refusal to submit to a lie-detector test, etc., itself necessarily
deals only in possibilities, not certainties. Yet this exclusion is consist34 With respect to a defendant's prior criminal record, see, e.g., 1 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE
§ 196 (3rd Ed. 1940) and id. at vol. 3, SS 980-7; as to confessions, see, e.g., id. at vol. 3,
§S 821-67.
35 For a discussion of the effectiveness of these techniques, see note 39 infra.
36 See Note, Controlling Press and Radio Influence on Trials, 63 HARV. L. REV. 840
(1950).
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ently maintained or the adnission into evidence carefully controlled in
spite of the countervailing benefits which might accrue by freely
permitting jurors to learn the substance of any of the above, benefits
which could be considerably greater than those derived from the publication of this information to all the world, prospective jurors and
the public alike. A coerced confession, for example, may be a true
confession and its exclusion from a jury's consideration may materially harm the prosecution's case, but the possibility that a confession
secured under such conditions is unreliable and, more importantly,
the abhorrence with which a decent democratic society views such a
procedure combine to militate against its admission into evidenceY
But where are the countervailing benefits in the publication of a
confession by the press before the evidentiary value of such a document or statement can be tested in court? Will the public be any safer
in the knowledge that a suspect has confessed, when that confession
may have been induced by means which cast such doubt on its validity that a jury will not be permitted to consider it? Will its confidence
in the effectiveness of the police be intelligently enhanced by publication in such circumstances?
In the almost total absence of reasonable and appreciable benefits
which inure to the public from the disclosure of information which
courts strive so mightily to keep from the knowledge of the factfinders until a proper basis has been laid for its admission, it is to be
wondered why, save for unquestioning attachment to the analytically
neglected slogan of "freedom of the press," this practice has been allowed to continue. The policy of the law has always been to weigh
competing interests in order to arrive at a fair accommodation when
there is at least some discernible merit in pursuing either course. 8 In
37 See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961).

38 E.g., Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 396-97
(1962), stated that "the right of free speech, strong though it be, is not absolute; when
the right to speak conflicts with the right to an impartial judicial proceeding, an accommodation must be made to preserve the essence of both. Thus in Bridges v. California
. at 271, the Court said:
'The very word "trial" connotes decisions on the evidence and arguments properly
advanced in open court. Legal trials are not like elections, to be won through the use
of the meeting-hall, the radio, and the newspaper .... We must therefore turn to the
particular utterances here in question and the circumstancs of their publication to deter-

mine to what extent the substantive evil of unfair administration of justice was a likely
consequence, and whether the degree of likelihood was sufficient to justify summary
punishment.'
"And again in Pevnekanmp v. Florida,... (at) 347: 'Courts must have power to protect
the interests of prisoners and litigants before them from unseemly efforts to pervert
judicial action.' See Craig v. Harney, . . . (at) 372-373."
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the area of free press versus fair trial, the propriety and importance of
invoking this policy in favor of a readjustment should be apparent in
light of the imbalance of benefit and detriment which the present accommodation, if such it be, permits, and in face of the indisputably
great and ever-growing audience which the press is able to reach and

influence.
PRESENT SOLUTIONS

The present means by which the law purports to deal with the
excesses of the press are almost all in the nature of afterthoughts or
aftereffects.3 9 While the Supreme Court has held that in a strong
enough case prejudice resulting from pretrial publicity will be found
as a matter of law,4 ° thereby obviating the necessity of proving actual
prejudice of individual jurors (often a quixotic effort), the best that
such a determination can produce is a reversed conviction. Although
some of the vagaries of reversal and retrial have already been discussed, 41 it is important to mention one other consideration which adds
to the illusory nature of reversals as a remedy in these cases.
When criminal convictions are reversed for reasons other than
prejudicial publicity, such as for the admission into evidence of a
39 These means include such pretrial devices as granting a continuance or a change of
venue. While a continuance may reduce some of the damage caused by prejudicial publicity, it may itself constitute injustice to either the accused or the public. Difficulties of
trial are increased, witnesses may disappear or forget, and the Sixth Amendment's insistence on a "speedy" trial is not observed.
As to change of venue, it is not always readily granted. Even when it is, the prospects
of appreciably diminished publicity are not good considering the present-day reach of
news media. Furthermore, the sixth amendment requires that the accused be tried by
"an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed...."
The use of the voir dire examination in the selection of a jury is another means by
which prejudice is sought to be weeded out. While this procedure must be credited with
some effectiveness, there is no way of knowing whether all the prejudice implanted by
press reports, both conscious and subconscious, has been reached, and even whether that
which is reached has been wholly expunged. The same is essentially true of cautionary
instructions during the course of the trial. As Mr. Justice Jackson said, concurring in
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949): "The naive assumption that
prejudicial effects can be overcome by instruction to the jury ... all practicing lawycrs
know to be unmitigated fiction."
Locking up the jury, while it is a device which should be mentioned, is a drastic and
expensive means of combating prejudicial publicity, and, in any event, is no safeguard
against the adverse effects of pretrial publicity. Few courts would inconvenience jurors
by locking them up from the inception of a case, and, in fact, this procedure may produce resentment by the jury against the person requesting it.
40 See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) and Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310

(1959).
41

Scc tcxt accompanying notes 24-27 supra.
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coerced confession or of illegally seized evidence, the effect of: the
reversal is not only to afford the accused a new trial at' which the
coerced confession or illegally seized evidence will be excluded, but
to demonstrate to those responsible for it that there is nothing to be
gained by coercion or illegal seizure.4 2 Consequently, reversal in these
situations has the very important by-product of supervising the administration of justice at the law enforcement level. And, in another
context, when a reversal is the result of some error committed by a
judge during the course of a trial, the ancillary effect of the reversal
is to admonish him that a repetition of the error may result in further
reversal. Yet, when a conviction is reversed for reasons of publicity, it
has no effect whatsoever as a sanction against the press, and there is
consequently nothing in the reversal which prevents prejudicial press
treatment of the case before or during any retrial or similar treatment
of future trials of other defendants.
The only concretely available sanction against the press in the foregoing circumstances is the power of the court to punish for contempt,4 3 but this is a circumscribed power which has been more
recently narrowed than broadened. Until 1941 the substantive rule regarding contempt was, in effect, that the publication of matter which
had a tendency to, or was calculated to, obstruct justice was punishabre by the court.4' This rule, the so-called "tendency rule," was discarded in favor of the stricter test enunciated in Bridges v. California,4" the nub of which is that the right of free comment is limited
only to situations where there is a "clear and present danger" to the
administration of justice. 46 The Supreme Court reaffirmed the "clear

and present danger" test in Pennekamp v. Florida,4 7 Craig v. Harney48
49
and, most recently, in Wood v. Georgia.
42 See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341-47 (1943) and Rogers v. Richmond, note 37 supra.
43 A civil action may also be brought by the litigant or the accused against an offending newspaper, either for libel or in an especially provided statutory form. An action
for libel, however, can only reach defamatory publications and may be defended on
the ground of truth or privilege. Only Pennsylvania has provided a. statutory action in
favor of a person "aggrieved by publication concerning his trial, which would improperly tend to bias the minds" of the triers of fact (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 52045 (1930)),
but no action has ever been brought under it.
44 See Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918).
45 3-14
U.S. 252 (1941).
46I."at 261-62, 267.
48 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
47 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
41)370 U.S. 375 (1962).
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The Bridges, Pennekamp and Craig cases each involved press comments and reports on matters tried to a judge without a jury and resulted in reversals of contempt convictions." The cases which have
reached the Supreme Court concerning alleged petit jury prejudice
through publication have turned on fair trial-due process questions
rather than free press considerations. And, notwithstanding Mr. Justice Frankfurter's recent assertion with respect to prejudicial press
disclosures that "the Court has not yet decided that, while convictions must be reversed and miscarriages of justice result because the
minds of jurors or potential jurors were poisoned, the poisoner is constitutionally protected in plying his trade," 51 there seems to be no inclination to deal by contempt citations with the excesses of the press
as they affect jurors. It therefore appears that, while the Supreme
Court may ultimately revise its attitude in light of changing circumstances, it is necessary to explore alternative solutions.
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

The purpose of this article thus far has been not only to demonstrate that existing remedies are less than adequate to cope with the
growing problem of prejudicial publicity; its purpose has equally been
to indicate the manner and extent to which press treatment of crime
and criminal trials poses a significant threat to the fair administration
of justice. It is apparent that one possible solution to the problem of
prejudicial publicity would be for the press-with the aid and advice
of the legal community, if necessary-voluntarily to impose effective
standards and restraints upon itself.
This, of course, is not a new proposal,52 nor is it one which, for
acceptance. 58 Indeed, H. L.
various reasons, has found much general
54
Mencken once wrote of such efforts:
50 Wood v. Georgia, the Supreme Court's most recent consideration of a contempt
conviction based on the clear and present danger doctrine, involved statements by a

sheriff at a press conference called by him which allegedly constituted a "clear, present
and imminent danger" to the proceedings of a grand jury convened to investigate rumors and accusations of alleged bloc voting by Negroes and the rumored use of money

by political leaders to obtain their votes.
51 Irvin v. Doud, 366 U.S. 717, 730 (1961)
52

(concurring opinion).

See Comment, The Case against Trial by Newspaper, 57 Nw. L. REV. 217, 237-38

(1962) and Edelman, Freedom of the Press-License to Obstruct Justice?,note 1 supra,
at 34-35.
53 Ibid.
54

Quoted in LeViness, Crime News, 66 U.S.L. Rev. 370, 370 (1932).
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Journalistic codes of ethics are all moonshine. Essentially, they are as absurd as
would be codes of street-car conductors, barbers or public job-holders. If
American journalism is to be purged of its present swinishness and brought up
to a decent level of repute-and God knows that such an improvement is
needed-it must be accomplished by the devices of morals, not by those of
honor. That is to say, it must be accomplished by external forces, and through
the medium of penalties exteriorly inflicted.

Nevertheless, while it may ultimately be concluded that external restraints are the only practical means of solution, an analysis of possible
voluntary action should not be foreclosed.
It is probably as generally unknown to the newspaper profession as
it is to the public that in 1923 the American Society of Newspaper
Editors adopted a set of ethical canons of journalism.5 5 For present
purposes, it is worthwhile to quote the canon entitled "Decency":
7. Decency-A newspaper cannot escape conviction of insincerity if, while
professing high moral purpose, it supplies incentives to base conduct, such as
are to be found in details of crime and vice, publication of which is not demon-

strably for the general good. Lacking authority to enforce its canons, the journalism here represented can but express the hope that deliberate pandering to
vicious instincts will encounter effective public disapproval or yield to the influence of a preponderant professional condemnation.

This canon, by its very words, expresses the essence of the problem.
On the one hand, much of this article has been directed towards showing how press "incentives" to the kind of "base conduct" which the
profession itself condemns have an adverse effect on the fair administration of criminal justice. Yet, on the other hand, the admitted lack
of authority within the profession to enforce its own code of conduct
has obviously permitted the behavior which is condemned to continue.
In the legal, medical and other professions, means have been established by which members may be disciplined for infractions of
particular canons of ethics, and while these means may not reach every such departure, they are continually invoked against violators and
consequently provide a significant deterrent to "incentives to base
conduct." But no disciplinary machinery exists within the newspaper
profession, nor, apparently, is there a desire to establish any. 6 What55 "Ethical Rules" adopted by the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 28,
1923.

56 Mark Etheridge, board chairman of the Courier-Journal and Louisville Times,
stated recently in one of a series of interviews on the "American Character" conducted
by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions:
"I have been going to American Newspaper Publishers Association conventions for
twenty-five or thirty years, but I've quit going to the meetings. They talk mostly about
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ever economic or social rationalizations are put forward to justify the
absence of such machinery,5 T the fact is that there is no compelling
reason why the newspaper profession, if it made the effort, could not
discipline itself just as other learned groups, subject to many of the
same economic and social pressures, have seen fit to do.
Voluntary action by the press may not be easy to instigate, but it
should not be written off as a possible solution to the problem of
prejudicial publicity.-" If representatives of the newspaper profession
were able to meet and agree on a code of conduct, they should be able
to meet and agree on the machinery for its enforcement. And surely
advertising, circulation, production and labor problems-things of that sort. There's
very little discussion about the content of newspapers. On the other hand, Southern
newspaper publishers usually have some provocative speeches at their regional meetings.
They do discuss content and other editorial problems.
"In the last ten years the American Society of Newspaper Editors has become the
most important of the newspaper associations. The editors do discuss editorial and
news problems. They are about the only people in the newspaper business who get
down to the fundamentals of what the newspaper business is all about."
57 "There are, however, strong forces which probably would prevent effective internal control. For example, many editors believe that they must emphasize morbid and
shocking crime news in order to prosper, and some further justify 'trial by newspaper'
by stating that one obligation of their profession is to attempt to reduce crime. That
the newspapers can voluntarily refrain completely from printing prejudicial material is
doubtful, in light of the compulsion of competition and the lack of workable standards
of prejudice." Comment, The Case against Trial by Newspaper, 57 Nw. L. REV. 217,
237-38 (1962) and accompanying notes.
5s8
Voluntary action has been taken in some areas of the country. E.g., in Rhode
Island, according to Judge Joseph R. Weisberger of the Superior Court of Rhode
Island, "a very fine working arrangement has been reached without necessity of court
rule under which The Providence Journal and Evening Bulletin, our two great daily
newspapers, do not print any matter in connection with a trial which takes place outside
the presence of the jury. This is a salutary example of the contribution which can be
made to the rules of evidence by a responsible press. The same arrangement is observed
by The Pawtucket Times, and has been generally observed by The Newport Daily
News, The Westerly Sun, and other daily and weekly newspapers in our State...
"The Press, The Courts, and Canon 35," an address before the National Conference
of State Trial Judges at the 85th Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association,
August 4, 1962.
In 1924 The Chicago Tribune stated editorially: "The Tribune advocates and will
accept drastic restriction of this preliminary publicity. The penetration of the police
system and the courts by journalists must stop. With such a law there would be no
motivation for it. Though such a law will be revolutionary in American journalism,
though it is not financially advisable for newspapers, it still is necessary. Restrictions
must come." Quoted in Perry, The Courts, the Press, and the Public (Trial by Newspaper), 30 Mics. L. REv.228, 232 (1932). Unfortunately, Colonel McCormick reversed
his paper's position when, in 1952, he declared that a code of press conduct would do
the public an absolute disservice by preventing much reporting in the public's interest.
See Note, Press Comnent on PendingCriminal Trials, 38 VA. L. REV. 1057, 1070 (1952).
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the help and advice of the legal community in making provision for
the machinery and in drafting additional canons to protect the legitimate interests of both the press and the administration of justice would
be readily available if a genuine desire were evidenced by the newspaper profession. 9 I am frank to say, however, that, while the difficulties facing the press in providing for means of self-discipline are
not appreciably greater than those of other professions which have
already faced this task, I am not optimistic about the possibility of voluntary action, though it seems to me this is the course which any
self-respecting profession should follow.
In the absence of such action, the necessary alternative is the imposition of external restraints on the press. I would therefore join others
who advocate the adoption of legislation which would cover the problems in this area.60 Such legislation should provide for criminal penalties against any person responsible for the publication of prejudicial
information under conditions hereinafter described before its admission into evidence at the trial. It would thus not only reach newspapermen and their counterparts in other areas of news dissemination,
but also the sources of the published information such as defense attorneys, prosecutors or policemen. 6 ' It would, further, only apply to
criminal cases tried to a jury.62 Upon its violation, the offending party
would be proceeded against by information or indictment, would have
the right of trial by jury68 and the right of appeal.
59 There is language in The Case against Trial by Newspaper, note 57 supra, at 237
and notes 87-89, to the effect that "[s]ome journalists have indicated that, if the bar
were to prescribe reasonable standards to be followed, most newspapers would gladly
comply."
60 See e.g., the model statute proposed in The Case against Trial by Newspaper, note
57 supra, at 250-53; see also, Edelman, Freedom of the Press-License to Obstruct Justice?, note I supra,at 45-82.
01 This would augment Canon 20 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association, which condemns newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending
or anticipated litigation.
02 The restraints of the statute would cease to apply after the point at which the
accused executes a formal waiver of a jury trial, since it is generally accepted that judges
arc or should be better able to withstand the prejudicial effect of pretrial and trial publicity. Further, as is apparent from the Bridges, Pennekamp and Craig cases, the Supreme Court seems to recognize a distinction between the effect of prejudicial publicity
on a jury as against that on a judge.
6a The provision for a jury trial is, in part, meant to take into account any misgivings
by the press which stem from the fact that the present contempt procedure permits the
same judge who presided at the trial out of which the allegedly contemptuous publication arose to hear and decide the merits of the contempt citation.
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Following closely the outline suggested by Justice Meyer of the
Supreme Court of New York,6 4 the statute would be divided into two
sections. The first section, supported by a legislative finding, would
list specific disclosures which per se constitute a clear and present
danger of substantial prejudice to the fair administration of criminal
justice. The items therein would include (1) disclosure of the existence and substance of an alleged confession, (2) the prior criminal
record of an accused, (3) the fact that an accused refused to submit to
a lie-detector test, and (4) the existence and description of tangible
evidence seized from an accused during a search or arrest. The disclosure of each would be prohibited until its admission into evidence
at the trial, or, if not admitted, until the jury renders its verdict. Also
prohibited should be expressions of opinion, whether through man in
the street polls, columnists' comments or editorials, concerning the effect of evidence introduced, the credibility of witnesses or the guilt
of the accused, all of which may usurp the function of the jury. Publication of any of these items would, without more, amount to a violation of this section of the statute.
As to items in the second section, publication would not constitute
an offense unless the jury found that in the circumstances of the case
concerning which publication was made the material published created
a serious and imminent danger of substantial prejudice to the fair administration of criminal justice. In this second category would fall
material, such as interviews with the family of the victim of a crime,
statements as to the identity and possible testimony of prospective
witnesses, publication of the names and addresses of the jurors sitting
in the case, matter which appeals to racial, political, economic or other
bias, or other information concerning the facts or the parties, which
may pose a serious threat, depending on the circumstances of the case,
to the securing to either the prosecution or the defense of a fair trial.
This section would not prohibit the publication of these items outright, but would force the press to run the risk of their publication,
just as it does in the area of libel.
While this proposed outline by no means exhausts the statutory
possibilities or fully examines all the inherent problems, it is intended
04 Statutory proposal made by Justice Bernard S. Meyer in "Are Additional Remedies
Needed in the United States to Implement the Constitutional Guarantee of Fair Trial?"
at 8-15, an address before the National Conference of State Trial Judges at the 85th
Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, August 4, 1962.
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to encourage and point the way to appropriate legislative action. Furthermore, it is meant to demonstrate to the press that those responsible
for the fair administration of criminal justice are wholly disenchanted
with the fatalistic notion that "trial by newspaper" or by other news
media is "an unavoidable curse of metropolitan living .. ."65 In the

absence of voluntary action by the press, the constitutional right to a
fair trial will have to be secured by means which the press may find
repugnant but which will have been brought on by its own disregard
of this fundamental right. One way or the other, the right to a fair
trial, a cornerstone of justice, must be protected.
5- United States v. Leviton, F. 2d 848, 865 (2nd Cir. 1951) (dissenting opinion).

